The Nature of Truth, 2e
Classic and Contemporary Perspectives
ISBN: 9780262362092 | Copyright 2021
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| Contents (pg. v) | |
| Preface to the Second Edition: Truth in a Post-Truth Age (pg. ix) | |
| Acknowledgments (pg. xiii) | |
| Original Sources (pg. xv) | |
| I. Correspondence Theories (pg. xv) | |
| II. Coherence Theories (pg. xv) | |
| III. Pragmatist and Verificationist Theories (pg. xv) | |
| IV. Tarski’s Theory and Its Importance (pg. xvi) | |
| V. Deflationary Theories (pg. xvi) | |
| VI. Primitivist and Identity Theories (pg. xvii) | |
| VII. Pluralist and Replacement Theories (pg. xvii) | |
| Introduction: The Metaphysics of Truth (pg. 1) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 5) | |
| I. Correspondence Theories (pg. 7) | |
| Introduction (pg. 9) | |
| Note (pg. 13) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 13) | |
| 1. Truth and Falsehood (pg. 17) | |
| 2. Truth (pg. 23) | |
| 1 (pg. 23) | |
| 2 (pg. 23) | |
| 3 (pg. 25) | |
| 4 (pg. 28) | |
| 5 (pg. 29) | |
| 6 (pg. 30) | |
| 7 (pg. 32) | |
| Notes (pg. 32) | |
| 3. A Realist Conception of Truth (pg. 37) | |
| Introduction (pg. 37) | |
| The Choice of Truth-Bearers (pg. 38) | |
| How to Formulate the Realist Conception of Truth (pg. 40) | |
| A Defense of the Realist Conception of Truth (pg. 42) | |
| Does the Account Go Far Enough? (pg. 43) | |
| Epistemological Objections to the Realist Conception (pg. 45) | |
| Epistemic Conceptions of Truth (pg. 49) | |
| Notes (pg. 55) | |
| References (pg. 56) | |
| 4. On Truth (pg. 57) | |
| 1. The Plan (pg. 57) | |
| 2. Stabilizing Functions and Constructions (pg. 58) | |
| 3. Indicatives, Imperatives, and Interrogatives (pg. 59) | |
| 4. Sellars and the Translation Rubric: “ ‘___’ (in L) Means …” (pg. 60) | |
| 5. Strawson on Assertions of Identity; LTOBC on “Exists” (pg. 62) | |
| 6. Some Puzzling Conjunctions (pg. 63) | |
| 7. Conditionals (pg. 64) | |
| 8. Functions and Truth Conditions for “That p Is True” and for “s Is True” (pg. 65) | |
| 9. The Function of “s Is True” (pg. 66) | |
| 10. Truth Conditions for “s Is True” (pg. 67) | |
| 11. Truth Conditions for Sentences in Different Modalities (pg. 68) | |
| Notes (pg. 69) | |
| References (pg. 70) | |
| 5. In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth (pg. 71) | |
| I. The Disunity of Truth (pg. 73) | |
| II. The Unity of Truth (pg. 83) | |
| III. Conclusion (pg. 94) | |
| Notes (pg. 95) | |
| II. Coherence Theories (pg. 101) | |
| Introduction (pg. 103) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 104) | |
| 6. Coherence as the Nature of Truth (pg. 107) | |
| 1 (pg. 107) | |
| 2 (pg. 107) | |
| 3 (pg. 108) | |
| 4 (pg. 109) | |
| 5 (pg. 110) | |
| 6 (pg. 111) | |
| 7 (pg. 111) | |
| 8 (pg. 112) | |
| 9 (pg. 113) | |
| 10 (pg. 115) | |
| 11 (pg. 115) | |
| 12 (pg. 116) | |
| 13 (pg. 117) | |
| 14 (pg. 118) | |
| 15 (pg. 119) | |
| 16 (pg. 119) | |
| Notes (pg. 120) | |
| 7. The Coherence Theory (pg. 121) | |
| I (pg. 121) | |
| II (pg. 125) | |
| III (pg. 136) | |
| Notes (pg. 145) | |
| References (pg. 147) | |
| III. Pragmatist and Verificationist Theories (pg. 149) | |
| Introduction (pg. 151) | |
| Classical Pragmatism: Peirce, James, and Misak (pg. 151) | |
| Dummett and Verificationist Anti-realism (pg. 153) | |
| Contemporary Pragmatism: Putnam and Rorty (pg. 154) | |
| Notes (pg. 156) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 156) | |
| 8. How to Make Our Ideas Clear (pg. 159) | |
| I (pg. 159) | |
| II (pg. 162) | |
| III (pg. 167) | |
| IV (pg. 168) | |
| Notes (pg. 172) | |
| 9. Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth (pg. 173) | |
| Notes (pg. 185) | |
| 10. Truth, Inquiry, and Experience: A Pragmatist Epistemology (pg. 187) | |
| Peirce, Truth, and the End of Inquiry (pg. 187) | |
| Philosophy, Practice, and Correspondence (pg. 188) | |
| Bivalence (pg. 195) | |
| Convergence and the End of Inquiry (pg. 197) | |
| Notes (pg. 204) | |
| References (pg. 205) | |
| 11. Truth (pg. 209) | |
| 12. Two Philosophical Perspectives (pg. 225) | |
| Internalism and Relativism (pg. 228) | |
| Notes (pg. 230) | |
| 13. Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright (pg. 231) | |
| Notes (pg. 246) | |
| IV. Tarski’s Theory and Its Importance (pg. 255) | |
| Introduction (pg. 257) | |
| Notes (pg. 260) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 261) | |
| 14. The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics (pg. 265) | |
| I. Exposition (pg. 265) | |
| II. Polemical Remarks (pg. 278) | |
| Notes (pg. 285) | |
| References (pg. 289) | |
| 15. Tarski’s Theory of Truth (pg. 291) | |
| I (pg. 291) | |
| II (pg. 296) | |
| III (pg. 299) | |
| IV (pg. 302) | |
| V (pg. 309) | |
| Notes (pg. 313) | |
| V. Deflationary Theories (pg. 317) | |
| Introduction (pg. 319) | |
| The Redundancy Theory (pg. 320) | |
| The Performative Theory (pg. 321) | |
| Disquotationalism (pg. 321) | |
| Prosententialism (pg. 323) | |
| Minimalism (pg. 324) | |
| Substitutionalism (pg. 324) | |
| Fictionalism (pg. 325) | |
| Major Objections to Deflationary Theories (pg. 326) | |
| Notes (pg. 328) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 330) | |
| 16. The Nature of Truth (pg. 335) | |
| 1. What Is Truth? (pg. 335) | |
| Notes (pg. 343) | |
| 17. Truth (pg. 345) | |
| I (pg. 345) | |
| II (pg. 346) | |
| III (pg. 350) | |
| IV (pg. 355) | |
| Notes (pg. 357) | |
| 18. Truth (pg. 359) | |
| 1. Vehicles of Truth (pg. 359) | |
| 2. Truth as Disquotation (pg. 360) | |
| 3. Paradox (pg. 362) | |
| 4. Tarski’s Construction (pg. 363) | |
| 5. Paradox Skirted (pg. 364) | |
| Notes (pg. 365) | |
| 19. Transparent Truth as a Logical Property (pg. 367) | |
| 1. Transparent Truth (pg. 367) | |
| 2. Deflationary Truth as a ‘Logical Property’ (pg. 368) | |
| 3. Logical Vocabulary as Universal (pg. 369) | |
| 4. Two Sorts of Logical Properties (pg. 370) | |
| 5. Transparent Truth as a Logical Property (pg. 372) | |
| 6. Some Objections and Replies (pg. 374) | |
| 7. Concluding Remarks (pg. 375) | |
| Notes (pg. 375) | |
| References (pg. 377) | |
| 20. The Prosentential Theory: Further Reflections on Locating Our Interest in Truth (pg. 379) | |
| 1. The Prosentential Theory (pg. 379) | |
| 2. Separation (pg. 382) | |
| 3. What Is a Theory of Truth? (pg. 383) | |
| 4. Linguistic Competence and the Concept of Truth (pg. 386) | |
| 5. Explanatory Role (pg. 389) | |
| Notes (pg. 393) | |
| References (pg. 395) | |
| 21. A Defense of Minimalism (pg. 397) | |
| Notes (pg. 408) | |
| 22. A Substitutional Theory of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence (pg. 413) | |
| I. A Substitutional Theory of Truth (pg. 414) | |
| II. A Substitutional Theory of Semantic Relations (pg. 419) | |
| III. Substitutionalism and Reduction (pg. 420) | |
| IV. Substitutionalism and the Laws of Folk Psychology (pg. 424) | |
| Notes (pg. 427) | |
| References (pg. 428) | |
| 23. Deflationism as Alethic Fictionalism via a SPIF Account of Truth-Talk (pg. 429) | |
| 1. T-Deflationism and Representational Aides (pg. 429) | |
| 2. Semantic Pretense-Involving Fictionalism (pg. 430) | |
| 3. Our SPIF Account of Truth-Talk (pg. 432) | |
| 4. Conclusions (pg. 444) | |
| Notes (pg. 447) | |
| References (pg. 451) | |
| 24. Truth and Insubstantiality: The Metaphysics of Deflationism (pg. 455) | |
| 1. Moderate Deflationism versus Pure Deflationism (pg. 455) | |
| 2. Three Constraints (pg. 456) | |
| 3. Truth’s Insubstantiality: Locating the Core Theses (pg. 458) | |
| 4. Understanding Moderate Deflationism (pg. 467) | |
| Notes (pg. 468) | |
| References (pg. 471) | |
| 25. The Use of Force against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth (pg. 475) | |
| I. Deflating Truth (pg. 476) | |
| II. Truth and the Force of Assertion (pg. 482) | |
| III. Assertion as Taking-True (pg. 491) | |
| Notes (pg. 498) | |
| References (pg. 501) | |
| VI. Primitivist and Identity Theories (pg. 503) | |
| Introduction (pg. 505) | |
| Primitivist Theories (pg. 505) | |
| Identity Theories (pg. 507) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 507) | |
| 26. The Folly of Trying to Define Truth (pg. 511) | |
| Notes (pg. 523) | |
| 27. Primitivism about Truth (pg. 525) | |
| 1. Introduction (pg. 525) | |
| 2. What Is Primitivism? (pg. 525) | |
| 3. Arguments for Primitivism (pg. 528) | |
| 4. Objections to Primitivism (pg. 534) | |
| 5. Connections to Metaphysics (pg. 536) | |
| Notes (pg. 537) | |
| References (pg. 537) | |
| 28. Truth: The Identity Theory (pg. 539) | |
| I (pg. 539) | |
| II (pg. 544) | |
| Notes (pg. 549) | |
| References (pg. 553) | |
| VII. Pluralist and Replacement Theories (pg. 555) | |
| Introduction (pg. 557) | |
| Pluralist Theories (pg. 557) | |
| Replacement Theories (pg. 560) | |
| Notes (pg. 562) | |
| Further Reading (pg. 562) | |
| 29. Minimalism, Deflationism, Pragmatism, Pluralism (pg. 567) | |
| 1. Minimalism and Deflationism: An Overview (pg. 567) | |
| 2. The Inflationary Argument (pg. 570) | |
| 3. Pragmatism and Pluralism (I): Peirce and Putnam (pg. 573) | |
| 4. Pragmatism and Pluralism (II): Superassertibility (pg. 582) | |
| 5. Superassertibility as a Model of Truth (pg. 588) | |
| Notes (pg. 590) | |
| 30. Three Questions for Truth Pluralism (pg. 597) | |
| 1. Three Questions (pg. 597) | |
| 2. What Makes a Theory a Theory of Truth? (pg. 598) | |
| 3. A Functional Analysis (pg. 600) | |
| 4. The Nature of Truth: Four Initial Options (pg. 602) | |
| 5. Truth as Immanent (pg. 605) | |
| 6. Plain Truth (pg. 608) | |
| 7. Conclusion (pg. 613) | |
| Notes (pg. 613) | |
| References (pg. 615) | |
| 31. Truth, Winning, and Simple Determination Pluralism (pg. 619) | |
| 1. Winning and Truth, Unity and Plurality (pg. 619) | |
| 2. Winning: A Proposal (pg. 620) | |
| 3. Truth: Simple Determination Pluralism (pg. 621) | |
| 4. Advantages of Simple Determination Pluralism (pg. 623) | |
| 5. Conclusion (pg. 625) | |
| Notes (pg. 626) | |
| References (pg. 627) | |
| 32. Austere Truth Pluralism (pg. 629) | |
| 1. Truth Pluralism: Strong versus Moderate (pg. 629) | |
| 2. Convenient Truth: The One-Many Duality of Generic Truth (pg. 631) | |
| 3. Return of the Many: The Unity of Truth Grounded by the Plurality of Its Grounds (pg. 632) | |
| 4. Austere Truth Pluralism (pg. 635) | |
| 5. Applying Austere Truth Pluralism: Mixed Compounds and Mixed Inferences (pg. 639) | |
| 6. Austere Truth Pluralism: Further Reflections (pg. 644) | |
| 7. Conclusion (pg. 650) | |
| Notes (pg. 650) | |
| References (pg. 654) | |
| 33. Deflationism, Pluralism, Expressivism, Pragmatism (pg. 657) | |
| Deflationism (pg. 657) | |
| A Threatened Pluralism (pg. 658) | |
| Frege’s Reaction (pg. 659) | |
| Deflationism Compromised? (pg. 660) | |
| A Normative Approach (pg. 661) | |
| A Different Pluralism (pg. 663) | |
| Beliefs and Their Mental and Social Neighbors (pg. 666) | |
| Truth Again (pg. 668) | |
| Notes (pg. 669) | |
| References (pg. 670) | |
| 34. Conceptual Engineering and Replacements for Truth (pg. 671) | |
| 1. Conceptual Engineering (pg. 671) | |
| 2. Two Traditions on Truth (pg. 674) | |
| 3. Truth Platitudes (pg. 675) | |
| 4. The Nightmare (pg. 680) | |
| 5. If There Is No Property of Being True, Then What Is There? (pg. 681) | |
| 6. New Aletheic Concepts (pg. 686) | |
| Notes (pg. 688) | |
| References (pg. 690) | |
| 35. Keeping “True”: A Case Study in Conceptual Ethics (pg. 693) | |
| I. Introduction (pg. 693) | |
| II. Inconsistency and Revisionism (pg. 694) | |
| III. Eklund’s Refrain and Scharp’s Complaint (pg. 698) | |
| IV. Retaining Truth: Circularity and Regress (pg. 703) | |
| V. Constructing a Kickable Ladder (pg. 707) | |
| VI. Coda (pg. 710) | |
| Notes (pg. 711) | |
| References (pg. 717) | |
| Contributors (pg. 719) | |
| Index (pg. 721) | |
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