Natural Resources as Capital

by Karp

ISBN: 9780262364393 | Copyright 2017

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This introduction to natural resource economics treats resources as a type of capital; their management is an investment problem requiring forward-looking behavior within a dynamic setting. Market failures are widespread, often associated with incomplete or nonexistent property rights, complicated by policy failures. The book covers standard resource economics topics, including both the Hotelling model for nonrenewable resources and models for renewable resources. The book also includes some topics in environmental economics that overlap with natural resource economics, including climate change.

The text emphasizes skills and intuition needed to think about dynamic models and institutional remedies in the presence of both market and policy failures. It presents the nuts and bolts of resource economics as applied to nonrenewable resources, including the two-period model, stock-dependent costs, and resource scarcity. The chapters on renewable resources cover such topics as property rights as an alternative to regulation, the growth function, steady states, and maximum sustainable yield, using fisheries as a concrete setting. Other, less standard, topics covered include microeconomic issues such as arbitrage and the use of discounting; policy problems including the "Green Paradox"; foundations for policy analysis when market failures are important; and taxation. Appendixes offer reviews of the relevant mathematics. The book is suitable for use by upper-level undergraduates or, with the appendixes, masters-level courses.

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Contents (pg. vii)
Preface (pg. xv)
Acknowledgments (pg. xix)
1. Resource Economics in the Anthropocene (pg. 1)
2. Preliminaries (pg. 11)
2.1 Arbitrage (pg. 12)
2.2 Comparative Statics (pg. 14)
2.3 Elasticities (pg. 15)
2.4 Competition and Monopoly (pg. 17)
2.5 Examples: Competition and Monopoly* (pg. 21)
2.6 Discounting (pg. 23)
2.7 Applications of Discounting (pg. 26)
2.8 Welfare (pg. 29)
2.9 Summary (pg. 31)
2.10 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 32)
3. Nonrenewable Resources (pg. 37)
3.1 Competitive Equilibrium (pg. 37)
3.2 Monopoly (pg. 41)
3.3 Comparative Statics (pg. 44)
3.4 Summary (pg. 44)
3.5 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 45)
4. Additional Tools (pg. 47)
4.1 A More General Cost Function (pg. 48)
4.2 The Perturbation Method (pg. 50)
4.2.1 It Is Optimal to Use All of the Resource (pg. 51)
4.2.2 It Is Optimal to Leave Some of the Resource Behind (pg. 54)
4.3 Rent (pg. 55)
4.4 Solving for the Equilibrium (pg. 58)
4.5 Examples* (pg. 58)
4.6 Summary (pg. 64)
4.7 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 64)
5. The Hotelling Model (pg. 69)
5.1 The Euler Equation (Hotelling Rule) (pg. 70)
5.2 Rent and Hotelling (pg. 71)
5.3 Shadow Prices (pg. 74)
5.4 The Order of Extraction of Deposits (pg. 75)
5.5 Resources and Asset Prices (pg. 76)
5.6 Completing the Solution (pg. 78)
5.7 Monopoly (pg. 82)
5.8 Summary (pg. 83)
5.9 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 84)
6. Empirics and the Hotelling Model (pg. 87)
6.1 Models and Empirics in Economics (pg. 88)
6.2 Hotelling and Prices (pg. 89)
6.3 Nonconstant Costs (pg. 90)
6.4 Testing Extensions of the Model (pg. 92)
6.5 Summary (pg. 99)
6.6 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 100)
7. Backstop Technology (pg. 103)
7.1 The Backstop Model (pg. 104)
7.2 A Two-Period Example (pg. 105)
7.3 The T-period Problem (pg. 107)
7.4 More General Cost Functions (pg. 110)
7.4.1 Costs Depend on Extraction but Not on Stock (pg. 110)
7.4.2 Stock-Dependent Costs (pg. 111)
7.5 Summary (pg. 113)
7.6 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 113)
8. The Green Paradox (pg. 117)
8.1 The Approach (pg. 118)
8.2 Cumulative Extraction and the Extraction Profile (pg. 120)
8.3 Why Does the Extraction Profile Matter? (pg. 121)
8.4 Discussion of the Paradox (pg. 124)
8.5 Summary (pg. 127)
8.6 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 128)
9. Policy in a Second-Best World (pg. 131)
9.1 Welfare and Second-Best Policies (pg. 133)
9.2 Monopoly+Pollution (pg. 134)
9.3 Distortionary Taxes (pg. 137)
9.4 Output and Input Subsidies (pg. 139)
9.5 Policy Complements (pg. 143)
9.6 Politics and Lobbying (pg. 146)
9.7 Summary (pg. 148)
9.8 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 149)
10. Taxes: An Introduction (pg. 153)
10.1 Tax Incidence and Equivalence (pg. 154)
10.2 A Graphical and Algebraic Perspective (pg. 156)
10.3 Tax Incidence and Deadweight Loss (pg. 157)
10.4 A Closer Look at Welfare (pg. 160)
10.5 Taxes and Cap and Trade (pg. 163)
10.6 Summary (pg. 167)
10.7 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 168)
11. Taxes: Nonrenewable Resources (pg. 171)
11.1 Current Fossil Fuel Policies (pg. 172)
11.2 The Logic of Resource Taxes (pg. 174)
11.3 Investment (pg. 176)
11.4 An Example (pg. 178)
11.4.1 The Price Trajectories (pg. 179)
11.4.2 Tax Incidence (pg. 180)
11.4.3 Welfare Changes (pg. 181)
11.4.4 Anticipated versus Unanticipated Taxes (pg. 183)
11.5 Summary (pg. 185)
11.6 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 186)
12. Property Rights and Regulation (pg. 189)
12.1 Overview of Property Rights (pg. 190)
12.2 The Coase Theorem (pg. 193)
12.3 Fisheries: The Basics (pg. 195)
12.4 A Model of Overcapitalization* (pg. 197)
12.5 Property Rights–Based Regulation (pg. 200)
12.5.1 Reducing Industry Costs (pg. 200)
12.5.2 Increasing Revenue (pg. 204)
12.5.3 Protecting Fish Stocks (pg. 205)
12.6 Subsidies to Fisheries (pg. 210)
12.7 Summary (pg. 212)
12.8 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 212)
13. Renewable Resources: Tools (pg. 217)
13.1 Growth Dynamics (pg. 218)
13.2 Harvest and Steady States (pg. 219)
13.3 Stability (pg. 221)
13.3.1 Discrete versus Continuous Time (pg. 221)
13.3.2 Stability in Continuous Time (pg. 222)
13.3.3 Stability in the Fishing Model (pg. 224)
13.4 Maximum Sustainable Yield (pg. 226)
13.5 Summary (pg. 227)
13.6 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 227)
14. The Open Access Fishery (pg. 229)
14.1 Harvest Rules (pg. 231)
14.1.1 Stock-Independent Costs (pg. 231)
14.1.2 Stock-Dependent Costs (pg. 231)
14.2 Policy Application (pg. 234)
14.3 Summary (pg. 237)
14.4 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 238)
15. The Sole-Owner Fishery (pg. 241)
15.1 The Euler Equation for the Sole Owner (pg. 242)
15.1.1 Intuition for the Euler Equation (pg. 243)
15.1.2 Rent (pg. 244)
15.2 Policy (pg. 246)
15.2.1 Optimal Policy under a Single Market Failure (pg. 247)
15.2.2 Optimal Policy under Two Market Failures (pg. 247)
15.2.3 Empirical Challenges (pg. 248)
15.3 The Steady State (pg. 249)
15.3.1 Harvest Costs Are Independent of Stock (pg. 250)
15.3.2 Harvest Costs Depend on the Stock (pg. 253)
15.3.3 Empirical Evidence (pg. 257)
15.4 Summary (pg. 257)
15.5 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 258)
16. Dynamic Analysis (pg. 261)
16.1 The Continuous Time Limit (pg. 262)
16.2 Harvest Rules for Stock-Independent Costs (pg. 263)
16.2.1 Tax Policy Implications of Tables 16.1 and 16.2 (pg. 265)
16.2.2 Confirming Table 16.2* (pg. 266)
16.3 Harvest Rules for Stock-Dependent Costs (pg. 268)
16.3.1 Tax Policy (pg. 268)
16.3.2 The Phase Portrait* (pg. 270)
16.4 Summary (pg. 273)
16.5 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 274)
17. Water Economics (pg. 275)
17.1 The Policy Context (pg. 277)
17.2 A Static Market Failure (pg. 281)
17.3 The Rebound Effect (pg. 286)
17.4 A Dynamic Market Failure (pg. 289)
17.4.1 The Ogallala Aquifer (pg. 289)
17.4.2 Stock Externalities for Groundwater (pg. 290)
17.4.3 A Dynamic Model of Water Economics (pg. 292)
17.5 Trade under Weak Property Rights (pg. 296)
17.6 Summary (pg. 298)
17.7 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 299)
18. Sustainability (pg. 305)
18.1 Measuring Resource Value or Price (pg. 306)
18.2 Weak and Strong Sustainability (pg. 309)
18.2.1 Generalizations and Empirics (pg. 312)
18.3 Welfare Measures (pg. 314)
18.4 Summary (pg. 318)
18.5 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 319)
19. Valuing the Future: Discounting (pg. 321)
19.1 The Social Cost of Carbon (pg. 323)
19.2 Discounting Utility or Consumption (pg. 324)
19.2.1 The Tyranny of Discounting (pg. 325)
19.2.2 Uncertain Timing (pg. 327)
19.3 The Consumption Discount Rate (pg. 329)
19.3.1 The Ramsey Formula (pg. 329)
19.3.2 The Importance of the Growth Trajectory (pg. 331)
19.3.3 Growth Uncertainty (pg. 332)
19.4 Hyperbolic Discounting (pg. 335)
19.4.1 Transfers Affecting a Single Person or Generation (pg. 336)
19.4.2 Transfers across Generations (pg. 337)
19.4.3 Individual versus Generational Discounting (pg. 339)
19.4.4 The Policy Relevance of Hyperbolic Discounting (pg. 339)
19.5 Summary (pg. 340)
19.6 Terms and Concepts, Study Questions, Exercises, and Sources (pg. 341)
Appendix A: Math Review (pg. 345)
A.1 Derivatives and Graphs (pg. 345)
A.2 Derivatives of Exponents (pg. 346)
A.3 The Sum, Product, and Quotient Rules (pg. 347)
A.4 The Chain Rule (pg. 347)
A.5 Partial Derivatives (pg. 348)
A.6 Total Derivatives (pg. 349)
A.7 Constrained Optimization (pg. 349)
A.8 First and Second Order Effects (pg. 350)
A.9 First Order Approximations (pg. 350)
Appendix B: The Hotelling Model (pg. 353)
B.1 Derivation of the Hotelling Equation (pg. 353)
B.2 Completing the Solution (pg. 354)
B.3 Inductive Proofs (pg. 357)
Appendix C: Algebra of Taxes (pg. 359)
C.1 The Open Economy (pg. 359)
C.2 Algebraic Verification of Tax Equivalence (pg. 361)
C.3 Approximating Tax Incidence (pg. 361)
C.4 Approximating Deadweight Loss (pg. 363)
C.5 Cap and Trade (pg. 364)
Appendix D: Continuous Time (pg. 367)
Appendix E: Bioeconomic Equilibrium (pg. 369)
Appendix F: The Euler Equation for the Sole-Owner Fishery (pg. 373)
Appendix G: Dynamics of the Sole-Owner Fishery (pg. 375)
G.1 Derivation of Equation 16.2 (pg. 375)
G.2 Differential Equation for Harvest (pg. 376)
G.3 Finding the Full Solution (pg. 378)
Appendix H: The Common-Property Water Game (pg. 379)
Appendix I: Sustainability (pg. 381)
I.1 Derivation of Equation 18.2 (pg. 381)
I.2 Confirming the Hartwick Rule (pg. 382)
I.3 Feasibility of Constant Consumption (pg. 382)
I.4 Derivation of Equation 18.6 (pg. 384)
Appendix J: Discounting (pg. 385)
J.1 The Ramsey Formula (pg. 385)
J.2 Optimism versus Pessimism about Growth (pg. 386)
References (pg. 389)
Index (pg. 399)
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