Market Design
Auctions and Matching
by Haeringer
ISBN: 9780262364607 | Copyright 2018
Instructor Requests
| Expand/Collapse All | |
|---|---|
| Contents (pg. vii) | |
| Preface (pg. xv) | |
| 1 Introduction (pg. 1) | |
| 1.1 Market and Market Design (pg. 1) | |
| 1.2 Do We Necessarily Have Prices? (pg. 2) | |
| 1.3 More on Markets (pg. 3) | |
| 1.4 Market Design: First Example (pg. 6) | |
| 2 Simple Auctions (pg. 13) | |
| 2.1 Introduction (pg. 13) | |
| 2.2 Valuations (pg. 16) | |
| 2.3 Payoffs and Objectives (pg. 17) | |
| 2.4 Ascending Auctions (pg. 18) | |
| 2.5 Second-Price Auction (pg. 25) | |
| 2.6 First-Price Auction (pg. 29) | |
| 2.7 Revenue Equivalence (pg. 36) | |
| 2.8 Reserve Price (pg. 40) | |
| 3 An Analysis of eBay (pg. 49) | |
| 3.1 Introduction (pg. 49) | |
| 3.2 eBay in Detail (pg. 50) | |
| 3.3 eBay as a First-Price Auction? (pg. 54) | |
| 3.4 Bid Sniping (pg. 54) | |
| 3.5 Reserve Price (pg. 59) | |
| 4 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction (pg. 61) | |
| 4.1 Introduction (pg. 61) | |
| 4.2 The Model (pg. 61) | |
| 4.3 The VCG Auction (pg. 63) | |
| 4.4 Incentives under the VCG Auction (pg. 67) | |
| 4.5 Relation with the Vickrey Auction (pg. 68) | |
| 4.6 The Complexity of the VCG Auction (pg. 69) | |
| 5 Keyword Auctions (pg. 71) | |
| 5.1 Introduction (pg. 71) | |
| 5.2 Running Billions and Billions of Auctions (pg. 73) | |
| 5.3 The Origins (pg. 74) | |
| 5.4 The Google Model: Generalized Second-Price Auction (pg. 76) | |
| 5.5 The Facebook Model: VCG for Internet Ads (pg. 91) | |
| 6 Spectrum Auctions (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1 How Can Spectrum Be Allocated? (pg. 95) | |
| 6.2 Issues (pg. 98) | |
| 6.3 The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (pg. 104) | |
| 6.4 Case Studies (pg. 106) | |
| 7 Financial Markets (pg. 113) | |
| 7.1 Introduction (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2 Treasury Auctions (pg. 113) | |
| 7.3 Double Auctions (pg. 119) | |
| 7.4 Initial Public Offering (pg. 123) | |
| 8 Trading (pg. 127) | |
| 8.1 Stock Markets (pg. 127) | |
| 8.2 Opening and Closing (pg. 132) | |
| 8.3 High-Frequency Trading (pg. 135) | |
| 8.4 Alternative Market Designs (pg. 145) | |
| 9 The Basic Matching Model (pg. 149) | |
| 9.1 The Basic Matching Model (pg. 149) | |
| 9.2 Algorithms and Mechanisms (pg. 156) | |
| 9.3 Finding Stable Matchings (pg. 159) | |
| 9.4 Preferences Over Stable Matchings (pg. 164) | |
| 9.5 Incentives with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 167) | |
| 10 The Medical Match (pg. 173) | |
| 10.1 History (pg. 173) | |
| 10.2 The Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 175) | |
| 10.3 Why Stability Matters (pg. 186) | |
| 10.4 The Rural Hospital Theorem (pg. 190) | |
| 10.5 The Case of Couples and the Engineering Method (pg. 192) | |
| 11 Assignment Problems (pg. 197) | |
| 11.1 The Basic Model (pg. 197) | |
| 11.2 Finding Efficient Assignments (pg. 199) | |
| 11.3 Mixed Public-Private Endowments (pg. 212) | |
| 12 Probabilistic Assignments (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1 Random Assignments (pg. 223) | |
| 12.2 Random Serial Dictatorship (pg. 229) | |
| 12.3 The Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (pg. 231) | |
| 13 School Choice (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1 The Many-to-One Assignment Model (pg. 239) | |
| 13.2 Competing Algorithms (pg. 245) | |
| 13.3 The Problem with the Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 256) | |
| 13.4 Applications (pg. 257) | |
| 14 School Choice: Further Developments (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1 Weak Priorities (pg. 263) | |
| 14.2 Constrained Choice (pg. 276) | |
| 15 Course Allocation (pg. 283) | |
| 15.1 Preliminaries (pg. 283) | |
| 5.2 Bidding for Courses (pg. 284) | |
| 15.3 The Harvard Business School Method (pg. 290) | |
| 15.4 The Wharton Method (pg. 295) | |
| 16 Kidney Exchange (pg. 303) | |
| 16.1 Background (pg. 303) | |
| 16.2 Trading Kidneys (pg. 305) | |
| 16.3 On the Number of Exchanges (pg. 313) | |
| Appendix A: Game Theory (pg. 317) | |
| A.1 Strategic Form Games (pg. 317) | |
| A.2 Extensive Form Games (pg. 319) | |
| A.3 Solving Games (pg. 324) | |
| A.4 Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information (pg. 330) | |
| Appendix B: Mechanism Design (pg. 335) | |
| B.1 Preliminaries (pg. 335) | |
| B.2 The Model (pg. 337) | |
| B.3 Dominant Strategy Implementation (pg. 341) | |
| B.4 Bayesian Mechanism Design (pg. 344) | |
| Appendix C: Order Statistics (pg. 349) | |
| C.1 Expected Highest Valuation (pg. 349) | |
| C.2 Expected Second-Highest Valuation (pg. 351) | |
| C.3 Conditional Expectation of the Highest Valuation (pg. 352) | |
| C.4 Changing the Upper and Lower Bounds (pg. 353) | |
| Notes (pg. 355) | |
| References (pg. 365) | |
| Index (pg. 369) | |
| Contents (pg. vii) | |
| Preface (pg. xv) | |
| 1. Introduction (pg. 1) | |
| 1.1. Market and Market Design (pg. 1) | |
| 1.2. Do We Necessarily Have Prices? (pg. 2) | |
| 1.3. More on Markets (pg. 3) | |
| 1.3.1. What a Market Needs to Work (pg. 4) | |
| 1.3.2. Commodities (pg. 5) | |
| 1.4. Market Design: First Example (pg. 6) | |
| 1.4.1. Feeding America (pg. 6) | |
| 1.4.2. The First Design (pg. 7) | |
| 1.4.3. The Problems … (pg. 9) | |
| 1.4.4. …and a Solution (pg. 10) | |
| 1.4.5. Results (pg. 11) | |
| 2. Simple Auctions (pg. 13) | |
| 2.1. Introduction (pg. 13) | |
| 2.1.1. Auctions: A Definition (pg. 14) | |
| 2.1.2. Auctions Are Everywhere (pg. 14) | |
| 2.2. Valuations (pg. 16) | |
| 2.3. Payoffs and Objectives (pg. 17) | |
| 2.4. Ascending Auctions (pg. 18) | |
| 2.4.1. The English Auctions (pg. 18) | |
| 2.4.2. Bids, Strategies, and Payoffs in the English Auctions (pg. 21) | |
| 2.4.3. Ticking Price (pg. 22) | |
| 2.4.4. Truthful Bidding (pg. 23) | |
| 2.5. Second-Price Auction (pg. 25) | |
| 2.5.1. The Essence of the English Auction (pg. 25) | |
| 2.5.2. The Vickrey Auction (pg. 26) | |
| 2.5.3. English versus Second-Price Auctions (pg. 28) | |
| 2.6. First-Price Auction (pg. 29) | |
| 2.6.1. Definition (pg. 29) | |
| 2.6.2. Optimal Bids in the First-Price Auction (pg. 30) | |
| 2.6.3. Dutch Auction (pg. 34) | |
| 2.7. Revenue Equivalence (pg. 36) | |
| 2.8. Reserve Price (pg. 40) | |
| 2.8.1. Optimal Reserve Price (pg. 42) | |
| 2.8.2. Reserve Price versus Adding More Bidders (pg. 45) | |
| 3. An Analysis of eBay (pg. 49) | |
| 3.1. Introduction (pg. 49) | |
| 3.2. eBay in Detail (pg. 50) | |
| 3.2.1. Proxy Bidding (pg. 50) | |
| 3.2.2. Bids and Bid Increments (pg. 51) | |
| 3.2.3. Updating Rules (pg. 51) | |
| 3.3. eBay as a First-Price Auction? (pg. 54) | |
| 3.4. Bid Sniping (pg. 54) | |
| 3.4.1. Amazon versus eBay (pg. 55) | |
| 3.4.2. Data Analysis (pg. 56) | |
| 3.5. Reserve Price (pg. 59) | |
| 4. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auction (pg. 61) | |
| 4.1. Introduction (pg. 61) | |
| 4.2. The Model (pg. 61) | |
| 4.3. The VCG Auction (pg. 63) | |
| 4.3.1. Computing the Optimal Assignment (pg. 63) | |
| 4.3.2. Calculating Prices (pg. 66) | |
| 4.4. Incentives under the VCG Auction (pg. 67) | |
| 4.5. Relation with the Vickrey Auction (pg. 68) | |
| 4.6. The Complexity of the VCG Auction (pg. 69) | |
| 5. Keyword Auctions (pg. 71) | |
| 5.1. Introduction (pg. 71) | |
| 5.2. Running Billions and Billions of Auctions (pg. 73) | |
| 5.3. The Origins (pg. 74) | |
| 5.3.1. Payoff Flows (pg. 75) | |
| 5.4. The Google Model: Generalized Second-Price Auction (pg. 76) | |
| 5.4.1. Quality Scores (pg. 76) | |
| 5.4.2. Truthtelling under the GSP Auction (pg. 78) | |
| 5.4.3. Equilibrium under the GSP Auction (pg. 78) | |
| 5.4.4. Assumptions about the Long-Run Equilibria (pg. 79) | |
| 5.4.5. Refinement: Envy-Free Equilibrium (pg. 79) | |
| 5.4.6. The Generalized English Auction (pg. 88) | |
| 5.5. The Facebook Model: VCG for Internet Ads (pg. 91) | |
| 5.5.1. Comparing VCG and GSP Auctions (pg. 91) | |
| 5.5.2. The Rationale for VCG (pg. 94) | |
| 6. Spectrum Auctions (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1. How Can Spectrum Be Allocated? (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1.1. Lotteries (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1.2. Beauty Contests (pg. 96) | |
| 6.1.3. Why Run Auctions? (pg. 97) | |
| 6.2. Issues (pg. 98) | |
| 6.2.1. General Issues (pg. 98) | |
| 6.2.2. Collusion, Demand Reduction, and Entry (pg. 99) | |
| 6.2.3. Maximum Revenue (pg. 101) | |
| 6.2.4. The Exposure Problem (pg. 102) | |
| 6.2.5. Winner's Curse (pg. 103) | |
| 6.3. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (pg. 104) | |
| 6.4. Case Studies (pg. 106) | |
| 6.4.1. The U.S. 1994 PCS Broadband Auction (pg. 106) | |
| 6.4.2. Mistakes (pg. 109) | |
| 7. Financial Markets (pg. 113) | |
| 7.1. Introduction (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2. Treasury Auctions (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2.1. Outline (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2.2. How Treasury Auctions Work (pg. 115) | |
| 7.2.3. Analysis (pg. 118) | |
| 7.3. Double Auctions (pg. 119) | |
| 7.4. Initial Public Offering (pg. 123) | |
| 7.4.1. Allocation and Pricing through Contracts (pg. 124) | |
| 7.4.2. Auctions for IPOs (pg. 124) | |
| 8. Trading (pg. 127) | |
| 8.1. Stock Markets (pg. 127) | |
| 8.2. Opening and Closing (pg. 132) | |
| 8.3. High-Frequency Trading (pg. 135) | |
| 8.3.1. Market Structure (pg. 135) | |
| 8.3.2. Market Regulation (pg. 137) | |
| 8.3.3. Surfing on the Latency (pg. 139) | |
| 8.3.4. What Is the Matter with High Frequencies? (pg. 141) | |
| 8.3.5. A Flawed Market Design? (pg. 143) | |
| 8.4. Alternative Market Designs (pg. 145) | |
| 8.4.1. Slowing Down Markets? (pg. 145) | |
| 8.4.2. Frequent Batch Auctions (pg. 147) | |
| 9. The Basic Matching Model (pg. 149) | |
| 9.1. The Basic Matching Model (pg. 149) | |
| 9.1.1. Preferences (pg. 150) | |
| 9.1.2. Matching (pg. 152) | |
| 9.1.3. Stability (pg. 153) | |
| 9.2. Algorithms and Mechanisms (pg. 156) | |
| 9.2.1. Algorithms? (pg. 156) | |
| 9.2.2. Matching Mechanism (pg. 159) | |
| 9.3. Finding Stable Matchings (pg. 159) | |
| 9.3.1. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 160) | |
| 9.3.2. Deferred Acceptance and Stable Matchings (pg. 162) | |
| 9.4. Preferences Over Stable Matchings (pg. 164) | |
| 9.4.1. Musician-Optimal and Singer-Optimal Matchings (pg. 164) | |
| 9.4.2. Proofs (pg. 165) | |
| 9.5. Incentives with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 167) | |
| 10. The Medical Match (pg. 173) | |
| 10.1. History (pg. 173) | |
| 10.2. The Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 175) | |
| 10.2.1. Preferences in the Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 176) | |
| 10.2.2. Matchings and Stability in a Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 179) | |
| 10.2.3. Finding Stable Matchings (pg. 182) | |
| 10.2.4. One-to-One v. Many-to-One Matchings: Similarities and Differences (pg. 184) | |
| 10.3. Why Stability Matters (pg. 186) | |
| 10.3.1. A Natural Experiment (pg. 186) | |
| 10.3.2. Unraveling in the Lab (pg. 187) | |
| 10.4. The Rural Hospital Theorem (pg. 190) | |
| 10.5. The Case of Couples and the Engineering Method (pg. 192) | |
| 10.5.1. A Very Complex Problem (pg. 192) | |
| 10.5.2. When Theory Fails (pg. 193) | |
| 10.5.3. Fixing the NRMP (pg. 194) | |
| 11. Assignment Problems (pg. 197) | |
| 11.1. The Basic Model (pg. 197) | |
| 11.1.1. Public versus Private Endowments (pg. 198) | |
| 11.1.2. Evaluating Assignments (pg. 198) | |
| 11.2. Finding Efficient Assignments (pg. 199) | |
| 11.2.1. Serial Dictators (pg. 199) | |
| 11.2.2. Trading Cycles (pg. 200) | |
| 11.2.3. Implementing Allocation Rules (pg. 205) | |
| 11.2.4. Individual Rationality and the Core (pg. 210) | |
| 11.3. Mixed Public-Private Endowments (pg. 212) | |
| 11.3.1. Inefficient Mechanisms (pg. 213) | |
| 11.3.2. Two Efficient Solutions (pg. 217) | |
| 12. Probabilistic Assignments (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1. Random Assignments (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1.1. Preliminaries (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1.2. The Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem (pg. 225) | |
| 12.1.3. Evaluating Random Assignments (pg. 227) | |
| 12.2. Random Serial Dictatorship (pg. 229) | |
| 12.3. The Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (pg. 231) | |
| 13. School Choice (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1. The Many-to-One Assignment Model (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1.1. Preferences versus Priorities (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1.2. The Model (pg. 241) | |
| 13.1.3. Assignments (pg. 241) | |
| 13.1.4. Stability and Efficiency (pg. 242) | |
| 13.2. Competing Algorithms (pg. 245) | |
| 13.2.1. The Role of Each Side of the Market (pg. 245) | |
| 13.2.2. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 246) | |
| 13.2.3. The Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 248) | |
| 13.2.4. Top Trading Cycles (pg. 250) | |
| 13.3. The Problem with the Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 256) | |
| 13.4. Applications (pg. 257) | |
| 13.4.1. The Boston School Match (pg. 257) | |
| 13.4.2. The New York City School Match (pg. 259) | |
| 14. School Choice: Further Developments (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1. Weak Priorities (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1.1. The Problem (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1.2. Efficiency Loss (pg. 264) | |
| 14.1.3. The Student-Optimal Assignment with Weak Priorities (pg. 265) | |
| 14.1.4. Restoring Efficiency (pg. 266) | |
| 14.1.5. How to Break Ties If You Must (pg. 272) | |
| 14.2. Constrained Choice (pg. 276) | |
| 14.2.1. Issues (pg. 277) | |
| 14.2.2. From Very Manipulable to Less Manipulable (pg. 279) | |
| 15. Course Allocation (pg. 283) | |
| 15.1. Preliminaries (pg. 283) | |
| 15.2. Bidding for Courses (pg. 284) | |
| 15.2.1. The Bidding and Allocation Process (pg. 285) | |
| 15.2.2. Issues: Nonmarket Prices and Inefficiency (pg. 286) | |
| 15.2.3. Deferred Acceptance with Bids (pg. 288) | |
| 15.3. The Harvard Business School Method (pg. 290) | |
| 15.3.1. The Harvard Draft Mechanism (pg. 290) | |
| 15.3.2. Strategic Behavior (pg. 291) | |
| 15.3.3. Welfare (pg. 293) | |
| 15.4. The Wharton Method (pg. 295) | |
| 15.4.1. Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (pg. 296) | |
| 15.4.2. The Wharton Experiment (pg. 298) | |
| 16. Kidney Exchange (pg. 303) | |
| 16.1. Background (pg. 303) | |
| 16.2. Trading Kidneys (pg. 305) | |
| 16.2.1. Trades versus Waiting List (pg. 306) | |
| 16.2.2. The Kidney Exchange Algorithm (pg. 306) | |
| 16.2.3. Chain Selection Rules (pg. 309) | |
| 16.2.4. Efficiency and Incentives (pg. 311) | |
| 16.3. On the Number of Exchanges (pg. 313) | |
| Appendix A: Game Theory (pg. 317) | |
| A.1. Strategic Form Games (pg. 317) | |
| A.1.1. Definition (pg. 317) | |
| A.1.2. Pure and Mixed Strategies (pg. 318) | |
| A.2. Extensive Form Games (pg. 319) | |
| A.2.1. Definition (pg. 320) | |
| A.2.2. Strategies (pg. 321) | |
| A.2.3. Imperfect Information (pg. 322) | |
| A.3. Solving Games (pg. 324) | |
| A.3.1. Dominated and Dominant Strategies (pg. 324) | |
| A.3.2. Elimination of Dominated Strategies (pg. 326) | |
| A.3.3. Nash Equilibrium (pg. 328) | |
| A.4. Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information (pg. 330) | |
| A.4.1. Introductory Example (pg. 330) | |
| A.4.2. Definition (pg. 331) | |
| Appendix B: Mechanism Design (pg. 335) | |
| B.1. Preliminaries (pg. 335) | |
| B.2. The Model (pg. 337) | |
| B.2.1. Mechanism (pg. 337) | |
| B.2.2. Implementing Social Choice Functions (pg. 339) | |
| B.2.3. Direct versus Indirect Mechanism (pg. 340) | |
| B.3. Dominant Strategy Implementation (pg. 341) | |
| B.3.1. The Revelation Principle (pg. 341) | |
| B.3.2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (pg. 342) | |
| B.3.3. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism (pg. 343) | |
| B.4. Bayesian Mechanism Design (pg. 344) | |
| B.4.1. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (pg. 344) | |
| B.4.2. Trading: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (pg. 345) | |
| Appendix C: Order Statistics (pg. 349) | |
| C.1. Expected Highest Valuation (pg. 349) | |
| C.1.1. Obtaining the Cumulative Density Function (pg. 350) | |
| C.1.2. Obtaining the Probability Density Function (pg. 350) | |
| C.1.3. Calculate the Expectation (pg. 350) | |
| C.2. Expected Second-Highest Valuation (pg. 351) | |
| C.3. Conditional Expectation of the Highest Valuation (pg. 352) | |
| C.4. Changing the Upper and Lower Bounds (pg. 353) | |
| Notes (pg. 355) | |
| Chapter 1 (pg. 355) | |
| Chapter 2 (pg. 355) | |
| Chapter 3 (pg. 356) | |
| Chapter 4 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 5 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 6 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 7 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 8 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 9 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 10 (pg. 359) | |
| Chapter 11 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 12 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 13 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 14 (pg. 361) | |
| Chapter 15 (pg. 361) | |
| Chapter 16 (pg. 362) | |
| Appendix A (pg. 362) | |
| Appendix B (pg. 362) | |
| References (pg. 365) | |
| Index (pg. 369) | |
| 1.1. Market and Market Design (pg. 1) | |
| 1.2. Do We Necessarily Have Prices? (pg. 2) | |
| 1.3. More on Markets (pg. 3) | |
| 1.3.1. What a Market Needs to Work (pg. 4) | |
| 1.3.2. Commodities (pg. 5) | |
| 1.4. Market Design: First Example (pg. 6) | |
| 1.4.1. Feeding America (pg. 6) | |
| 1.4.2. The First Design (pg. 7) | |
| 1.4.3. The Problems … (pg. 9) | |
| 1.4.4. …and a Solution (pg. 10) | |
| 1.4.5. Results (pg. 11) | |
| 2.1. Introduction (pg. 13) | |
| 2.1.1. Auctions: A Definition (pg. 14) | |
| 2.1.2. Auctions Are Everywhere (pg. 14) | |
| 2.2. Valuations (pg. 16) | |
| 2.3. Payoffs and Objectives (pg. 17) | |
| 2.4. Ascending Auctions (pg. 18) | |
| 2.4.1. The English Auctions (pg. 18) | |
| 2.4.2. Bids, Strategies, and Payoffs in the English Auctions (pg. 21) | |
| 2.4.3. Ticking Price (pg. 22) | |
| 2.4.4. Truthful Bidding (pg. 23) | |
| 2.5. Second-Price Auction (pg. 25) | |
| 2.5.1. The Essence of the English Auction (pg. 25) | |
| 2.5.2. The Vickrey Auction (pg. 26) | |
| 2.5.3. English versus Second-Price Auctions (pg. 28) | |
| 2.6. First-Price Auction (pg. 29) | |
| 2.6.1. Definition (pg. 29) | |
| 2.6.2. Optimal Bids in the First-Price Auction (pg. 30) | |
| 2.6.3. Dutch Auction (pg. 34) | |
| 2.7. Revenue Equivalence (pg. 36) | |
| 2.8. Reserve Price (pg. 40) | |
| 2.8.1. Optimal Reserve Price (pg. 42) | |
| 2.8.2. Reserve Price versus Adding More Bidders (pg. 45) | |
| 3.1. Introduction (pg. 49) | |
| 3.2. eBay in Detail (pg. 50) | |
| 3.2.1. Proxy Bidding (pg. 50) | |
| 3.2.2. Bids and Bid Increments (pg. 51) | |
| 3.2.3. Updating Rules (pg. 51) | |
| 3.3. eBay as a First-Price Auction? (pg. 54) | |
| 3.4. Bid Sniping (pg. 54) | |
| 3.4.1. Amazon versus eBay (pg. 55) | |
| 3.4.2. Data Analysis (pg. 56) | |
| 3.5. Reserve Price (pg. 59) | |
| 4.1. Introduction (pg. 61) | |
| 4.2. The Model (pg. 61) | |
| 4.3. The VCG Auction (pg. 63) | |
| 4.3.1. Computing the Optimal Assignment (pg. 63) | |
| 4.3.2. Calculating Prices (pg. 66) | |
| 4.4. Incentives under the VCG Auction (pg. 67) | |
| 4.5. Relation with the Vickrey Auction (pg. 68) | |
| 4.6. The Complexity of the VCG Auction (pg. 69) | |
| 5.1. Introduction (pg. 71) | |
| 5.2. Running Billions and Billions of Auctions (pg. 73) | |
| 5.3. The Origins (pg. 74) | |
| 5.3.1. Payoff Flows (pg. 75) | |
| 5.4. The Google Model: Generalized Second-Price Auction (pg. 76) | |
| 5.4.1. Quality Scores (pg. 76) | |
| 5.4.2. Truthtelling under the GSP Auction (pg. 78) | |
| 5.4.3. Equilibrium under the GSP Auction (pg. 78) | |
| 5.4.4. Assumptions about the Long-Run Equilibria (pg. 79) | |
| 5.4.5. Refinement: Envy-Free Equilibrium (pg. 79) | |
| 5.4.6. The Generalized English Auction (pg. 88) | |
| 5.5. The Facebook Model: VCG for Internet Ads (pg. 91) | |
| 5.5.1. Comparing VCG and GSP Auctions (pg. 91) | |
| 5.5.2. The Rationale for VCG (pg. 94) | |
| 6.1. How Can Spectrum Be Allocated? (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1.1. Lotteries (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1.2. Beauty Contests (pg. 96) | |
| 6.1.3. Why Run Auctions? (pg. 97) | |
| 6.2. Issues (pg. 98) | |
| 6.2.1. General Issues (pg. 98) | |
| 6.2.2. Collusion, Demand Reduction, and Entry (pg. 99) | |
| 6.2.3. Maximum Revenue (pg. 101) | |
| 6.2.4. The Exposure Problem (pg. 102) | |
| 6.2.5. Winner's Curse (pg. 103) | |
| 6.3. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (pg. 104) | |
| 6.4. Case Studies (pg. 106) | |
| 6.4.1. The U.S. 1994 PCS Broadband Auction (pg. 106) | |
| 6.4.2. Mistakes (pg. 109) | |
| 7.1. Introduction (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2. Treasury Auctions (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2.1. Outline (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2.2. How Treasury Auctions Work (pg. 115) | |
| 7.2.3. Analysis (pg. 118) | |
| 7.3. Double Auctions (pg. 119) | |
| 7.4. Initial Public Offering (pg. 123) | |
| 7.4.1. Allocation and Pricing through Contracts (pg. 124) | |
| 7.4.2. Auctions for IPOs (pg. 124) | |
| 8.1. Stock Markets (pg. 127) | |
| 8.2. Opening and Closing (pg. 132) | |
| 8.3. High-Frequency Trading (pg. 135) | |
| 8.3.1. Market Structure (pg. 135) | |
| 8.3.2. Market Regulation (pg. 137) | |
| 8.3.3. Surfing on the Latency (pg. 139) | |
| 8.3.4. What Is the Matter with High Frequencies? (pg. 141) | |
| 8.3.5. A Flawed Market Design? (pg. 143) | |
| 8.4. Alternative Market Designs (pg. 145) | |
| 8.4.1. Slowing Down Markets? (pg. 145) | |
| 8.4.2. Frequent Batch Auctions (pg. 147) | |
| 9.1. The Basic Matching Model (pg. 149) | |
| 9.1.1. Preferences (pg. 150) | |
| 9.1.2. Matching (pg. 152) | |
| 9.1.3. Stability (pg. 153) | |
| 9.2. Algorithms and Mechanisms (pg. 156) | |
| 9.2.1. Algorithms? (pg. 156) | |
| 9.2.2. Matching Mechanism (pg. 159) | |
| 9.3. Finding Stable Matchings (pg. 159) | |
| 9.3.1. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 160) | |
| 9.3.2. Deferred Acceptance and Stable Matchings (pg. 162) | |
| 9.4. Preferences Over Stable Matchings (pg. 164) | |
| 9.4.1. Musician-Optimal and Singer-Optimal Matchings (pg. 164) | |
| 9.4.2. Proofs (pg. 165) | |
| 9.5. Incentives with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 167) | |
| 10.1. History (pg. 173) | |
| 10.2. The Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 175) | |
| 10.2.1. Preferences in the Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 176) | |
| 10.2.2. Matchings and Stability in a Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 179) | |
| 10.2.3. Finding Stable Matchings (pg. 182) | |
| 10.2.4. One-to-One v. Many-to-One Matchings: Similarities and Differences (pg. 184) | |
| 10.3. Why Stability Matters (pg. 186) | |
| 10.3.1. A Natural Experiment (pg. 186) | |
| 10.3.2. Unraveling in the Lab (pg. 187) | |
| 10.4. The Rural Hospital Theorem (pg. 190) | |
| 10.5. The Case of Couples and the Engineering Method (pg. 192) | |
| 10.5.1. A Very Complex Problem (pg. 192) | |
| 10.5.2. When Theory Fails (pg. 193) | |
| 10.5.3. Fixing the NRMP (pg. 194) | |
| 11.1. The Basic Model (pg. 197) | |
| 11.1.1. Public versus Private Endowments (pg. 198) | |
| 11.1.2. Evaluating Assignments (pg. 198) | |
| 11.2. Finding Efficient Assignments (pg. 199) | |
| 11.2.1. Serial Dictators (pg. 199) | |
| 11.2.2. Trading Cycles (pg. 200) | |
| 11.2.3. Implementing Allocation Rules (pg. 205) | |
| 11.2.4. Individual Rationality and the Core (pg. 210) | |
| 11.3. Mixed Public-Private Endowments (pg. 212) | |
| 11.3.1. Inefficient Mechanisms (pg. 213) | |
| 11.3.2. Two Efficient Solutions (pg. 217) | |
| 12.1. Random Assignments (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1.1. Preliminaries (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1.2. The Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem (pg. 225) | |
| 12.1.3. Evaluating Random Assignments (pg. 227) | |
| 12.2. Random Serial Dictatorship (pg. 229) | |
| 12.3. The Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (pg. 231) | |
| 13.1. The Many-to-One Assignment Model (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1.1. Preferences versus Priorities (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1.2. The Model (pg. 241) | |
| 13.1.3. Assignments (pg. 241) | |
| 13.1.4. Stability and Efficiency (pg. 242) | |
| 13.2. Competing Algorithms (pg. 245) | |
| 13.2.1. The Role of Each Side of the Market (pg. 245) | |
| 13.2.2. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 246) | |
| 13.2.3. The Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 248) | |
| 13.2.4. Top Trading Cycles (pg. 250) | |
| 13.3. The Problem with the Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 256) | |
| 13.4. Applications (pg. 257) | |
| 13.4.1. The Boston School Match (pg. 257) | |
| 13.4.2. The New York City School Match (pg. 259) | |
| 14.1. Weak Priorities (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1.1. The Problem (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1.2. Efficiency Loss (pg. 264) | |
| 14.1.3. The Student-Optimal Assignment with Weak Priorities (pg. 265) | |
| 14.1.4. Restoring Efficiency (pg. 266) | |
| 14.1.5. How to Break Ties If You Must (pg. 272) | |
| 14.2. Constrained Choice (pg. 276) | |
| 14.2.1. Issues (pg. 277) | |
| 14.2.2. From Very Manipulable to Less Manipulable (pg. 279) | |
| 15.1. Preliminaries (pg. 283) | |
| 15.2. Bidding for Courses (pg. 284) | |
| 15.2.1. The Bidding and Allocation Process (pg. 285) | |
| 15.2.2. Issues: Nonmarket Prices and Inefficiency (pg. 286) | |
| 15.2.3. Deferred Acceptance with Bids (pg. 288) | |
| 15.3. The Harvard Business School Method (pg. 290) | |
| 15.3.1. The Harvard Draft Mechanism (pg. 290) | |
| 15.3.2. Strategic Behavior (pg. 291) | |
| 15.3.3. Welfare (pg. 293) | |
| 15.4. The Wharton Method (pg. 295) | |
| 15.4.1. Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (pg. 296) | |
| 15.4.2. The Wharton Experiment (pg. 298) | |
| 16.1. Background (pg. 303) | |
| 16.2. Trading Kidneys (pg. 305) | |
| 16.2.1. Trades versus Waiting List (pg. 306) | |
| 16.2.2. The Kidney Exchange Algorithm (pg. 306) | |
| 16.2.3. Chain Selection Rules (pg. 309) | |
| 16.2.4. Efficiency and Incentives (pg. 311) | |
| 16.3. On the Number of Exchanges (pg. 313) | |
| A.1. Strategic Form Games (pg. 317) | |
| A.1.1. Definition (pg. 317) | |
| A.1.2. Pure and Mixed Strategies (pg. 318) | |
| A.2. Extensive Form Games (pg. 319) | |
| A.2.1. Definition (pg. 320) | |
| A.2.2. Strategies (pg. 321) | |
| A.2.3. Imperfect Information (pg. 322) | |
| A.3. Solving Games (pg. 324) | |
| A.3.1. Dominated and Dominant Strategies (pg. 324) | |
| A.3.2. Elimination of Dominated Strategies (pg. 326) | |
| A.3.3. Nash Equilibrium (pg. 328) | |
| A.4. Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information (pg. 330) | |
| A.4.1. Introductory Example (pg. 330) | |
| A.4.2. Definition (pg. 331) | |
| B.1. Preliminaries (pg. 335) | |
| B.2. The Model (pg. 337) | |
| B.2.1. Mechanism (pg. 337) | |
| B.2.2. Implementing Social Choice Functions (pg. 339) | |
| B.2.3. Direct versus Indirect Mechanism (pg. 340) | |
| B.3. Dominant Strategy Implementation (pg. 341) | |
| B.3.1. The Revelation Principle (pg. 341) | |
| B.3.2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (pg. 342) | |
| B.3.3. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism (pg. 343) | |
| B.4. Bayesian Mechanism Design (pg. 344) | |
| B.4.1. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (pg. 344) | |
| B.4.2. Trading: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (pg. 345) | |
| C.1. Expected Highest Valuation (pg. 349) | |
| C.1.1. Obtaining the Cumulative Density Function (pg. 350) | |
| C.1.2. Obtaining the Probability Density Function (pg. 350) | |
| C.1.3. Calculate the Expectation (pg. 350) | |
| C.2. Expected Second-Highest Valuation (pg. 351) | |
| C.3. Conditional Expectation of the Highest Valuation (pg. 352) | |
| C.4. Changing the Upper and Lower Bounds (pg. 353) | |
| Chapter 1 (pg. 355) | |
| Chapter 2 (pg. 355) | |
| Chapter 3 (pg. 356) | |
| Chapter 4 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 5 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 6 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 7 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 8 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 9 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 10 (pg. 359) | |
| Chapter 11 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 12 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 13 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 14 (pg. 361) | |
| Chapter 15 (pg. 361) | |
| Chapter 16 (pg. 362) | |
| Appendix A (pg. 362) | |
| Appendix B (pg. 362) | |
| 1.1. Market and Market Design (pg. 1) | |
| 1.2. Do We Necessarily Have Prices? (pg. 2) | |
| 1.3. More on Markets (pg. 3) | |
| 1.3.1. What a Market Needs to Work (pg. 4) | |
| 1.3.2. Commodities (pg. 5) | |
| 1.4. Market Design: First Example (pg. 6) | |
| 1.4.1. Feeding America (pg. 6) | |
| 1.4.2. The First Design (pg. 7) | |
| 1.4.3. The Problems … (pg. 9) | |
| 1.4.4. …and a Solution (pg. 10) | |
| 1.4.5. Results (pg. 11) | |
| 2.1. Introduction (pg. 13) | |
| 2.1.1. Auctions: A Definition (pg. 14) | |
| 2.1.2. Auctions Are Everywhere (pg. 14) | |
| 2.2. Valuations (pg. 16) | |
| 2.3. Payoffs and Objectives (pg. 17) | |
| 2.4. Ascending Auctions (pg. 18) | |
| 2.4.1. The English Auctions (pg. 18) | |
| 2.4.2. Bids, Strategies, and Payoffs in the English Auctions (pg. 21) | |
| 2.4.3. Ticking Price (pg. 22) | |
| 2.4.4. Truthful Bidding (pg. 23) | |
| 2.5. Second-Price Auction (pg. 25) | |
| 2.5.1. The Essence of the English Auction (pg. 25) | |
| 2.5.2. The Vickrey Auction (pg. 26) | |
| 2.5.3. English versus Second-Price Auctions (pg. 28) | |
| 2.6. First-Price Auction (pg. 29) | |
| 2.6.1. Definition (pg. 29) | |
| 2.6.2. Optimal Bids in the First-Price Auction (pg. 30) | |
| 2.6.3. Dutch Auction (pg. 34) | |
| 2.7. Revenue Equivalence (pg. 36) | |
| 2.8. Reserve Price (pg. 40) | |
| 2.8.1. Optimal Reserve Price (pg. 42) | |
| 2.8.2. Reserve Price versus Adding More Bidders (pg. 45) | |
| 3.1. Introduction (pg. 49) | |
| 3.2. eBay in Detail (pg. 50) | |
| 3.2.1. Proxy Bidding (pg. 50) | |
| 3.2.2. Bids and Bid Increments (pg. 51) | |
| 3.2.3. Updating Rules (pg. 51) | |
| 3.3. eBay as a First-Price Auction? (pg. 54) | |
| 3.4. Bid Sniping (pg. 54) | |
| 3.4.1. Amazon versus eBay (pg. 55) | |
| 3.4.2. Data Analysis (pg. 56) | |
| 3.5. Reserve Price (pg. 59) | |
| 4.1. Introduction (pg. 61) | |
| 4.2. The Model (pg. 61) | |
| 4.3. The VCG Auction (pg. 63) | |
| 4.3.1. Computing the Optimal Assignment (pg. 63) | |
| 4.3.2. Calculating Prices (pg. 66) | |
| 4.4. Incentives under the VCG Auction (pg. 67) | |
| 4.5. Relation with the Vickrey Auction (pg. 68) | |
| 4.6. The Complexity of the VCG Auction (pg. 69) | |
| 5.1. Introduction (pg. 71) | |
| 5.2. Running Billions and Billions of Auctions (pg. 73) | |
| 5.3. The Origins (pg. 74) | |
| 5.3.1. Payoff Flows (pg. 75) | |
| 5.4. The Google Model: Generalized Second-Price Auction (pg. 76) | |
| 5.4.1. Quality Scores (pg. 76) | |
| 5.4.2. Truthtelling under the GSP Auction (pg. 78) | |
| 5.4.3. Equilibrium under the GSP Auction (pg. 78) | |
| 5.4.4. Assumptions about the Long-Run Equilibria (pg. 79) | |
| 5.4.5. Refinement: Envy-Free Equilibrium (pg. 79) | |
| 5.4.6. The Generalized English Auction (pg. 88) | |
| 5.5. The Facebook Model: VCG for Internet Ads (pg. 91) | |
| 5.5.1. Comparing VCG and GSP Auctions (pg. 91) | |
| 5.5.2. The Rationale for VCG (pg. 94) | |
| 6.1. How Can Spectrum Be Allocated? (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1.1. Lotteries (pg. 95) | |
| 6.1.2. Beauty Contests (pg. 96) | |
| 6.1.3. Why Run Auctions? (pg. 97) | |
| 6.2. Issues (pg. 98) | |
| 6.2.1. General Issues (pg. 98) | |
| 6.2.2. Collusion, Demand Reduction, and Entry (pg. 99) | |
| 6.2.3. Maximum Revenue (pg. 101) | |
| 6.2.4. The Exposure Problem (pg. 102) | |
| 6.2.5. Winner's Curse (pg. 103) | |
| 6.3. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (pg. 104) | |
| 6.4. Case Studies (pg. 106) | |
| 6.4.1. The U.S. 1994 PCS Broadband Auction (pg. 106) | |
| 6.4.2. Mistakes (pg. 109) | |
| 7.1. Introduction (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2. Treasury Auctions (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2.1. Outline (pg. 113) | |
| 7.2.2. How Treasury Auctions Work (pg. 115) | |
| 7.2.3. Analysis (pg. 118) | |
| 7.3. Double Auctions (pg. 119) | |
| 7.4. Initial Public Offering (pg. 123) | |
| 7.4.1. Allocation and Pricing through Contracts (pg. 124) | |
| 7.4.2. Auctions for IPOs (pg. 124) | |
| 8.1. Stock Markets (pg. 127) | |
| 8.2. Opening and Closing (pg. 132) | |
| 8.3. High-Frequency Trading (pg. 135) | |
| 8.3.1. Market Structure (pg. 135) | |
| 8.3.2. Market Regulation (pg. 137) | |
| 8.3.3. Surfing on the Latency (pg. 139) | |
| 8.3.4. What Is the Matter with High Frequencies? (pg. 141) | |
| 8.3.5. A Flawed Market Design? (pg. 143) | |
| 8.4. Alternative Market Designs (pg. 145) | |
| 8.4.1. Slowing Down Markets? (pg. 145) | |
| 8.4.2. Frequent Batch Auctions (pg. 147) | |
| 9.1. The Basic Matching Model (pg. 149) | |
| 9.1.1. Preferences (pg. 150) | |
| 9.1.2. Matching (pg. 152) | |
| 9.1.3. Stability (pg. 153) | |
| 9.2. Algorithms and Mechanisms (pg. 156) | |
| 9.2.1. Algorithms? (pg. 156) | |
| 9.2.2. Matching Mechanism (pg. 159) | |
| 9.3. Finding Stable Matchings (pg. 159) | |
| 9.3.1. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 160) | |
| 9.3.2. Deferred Acceptance and Stable Matchings (pg. 162) | |
| 9.4. Preferences Over Stable Matchings (pg. 164) | |
| 9.4.1. Musician-Optimal and Singer-Optimal Matchings (pg. 164) | |
| 9.4.2. Proofs (pg. 165) | |
| 9.5. Incentives with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 167) | |
| 10.1. History (pg. 173) | |
| 10.2. The Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 175) | |
| 10.2.1. Preferences in the Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 176) | |
| 10.2.2. Matchings and Stability in a Many-to-One Matching Model (pg. 179) | |
| 10.2.3. Finding Stable Matchings (pg. 182) | |
| 10.2.4. One-to-One v. Many-to-One Matchings: Similarities and Differences (pg. 184) | |
| 10.3. Why Stability Matters (pg. 186) | |
| 10.3.1. A Natural Experiment (pg. 186) | |
| 10.3.2. Unraveling in the Lab (pg. 187) | |
| 10.4. The Rural Hospital Theorem (pg. 190) | |
| 10.5. The Case of Couples and the Engineering Method (pg. 192) | |
| 10.5.1. A Very Complex Problem (pg. 192) | |
| 10.5.2. When Theory Fails (pg. 193) | |
| 10.5.3. Fixing the NRMP (pg. 194) | |
| 11.1. The Basic Model (pg. 197) | |
| 11.1.1. Public versus Private Endowments (pg. 198) | |
| 11.1.2. Evaluating Assignments (pg. 198) | |
| 11.2. Finding Efficient Assignments (pg. 199) | |
| 11.2.1. Serial Dictators (pg. 199) | |
| 11.2.2. Trading Cycles (pg. 200) | |
| 11.2.3. Implementing Allocation Rules (pg. 205) | |
| 11.2.4. Individual Rationality and the Core (pg. 210) | |
| 11.3. Mixed Public-Private Endowments (pg. 212) | |
| 11.3.1. Inefficient Mechanisms (pg. 213) | |
| 11.3.2. Two Efficient Solutions (pg. 217) | |
| 12.1. Random Assignments (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1.1. Preliminaries (pg. 223) | |
| 12.1.2. The Birkhoff–von Neumann Theorem (pg. 225) | |
| 12.1.3. Evaluating Random Assignments (pg. 227) | |
| 12.2. Random Serial Dictatorship (pg. 229) | |
| 12.3. The Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (pg. 231) | |
| 13.1. The Many-to-One Assignment Model (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1.1. Preferences versus Priorities (pg. 239) | |
| 13.1.2. The Model (pg. 241) | |
| 13.1.3. Assignments (pg. 241) | |
| 13.1.4. Stability and Efficiency (pg. 242) | |
| 13.2. Competing Algorithms (pg. 245) | |
| 13.2.1. The Role of Each Side of the Market (pg. 245) | |
| 13.2.2. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 246) | |
| 13.2.3. The Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 248) | |
| 13.2.4. Top Trading Cycles (pg. 250) | |
| 13.3. The Problem with the Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (pg. 256) | |
| 13.4. Applications (pg. 257) | |
| 13.4.1. The Boston School Match (pg. 257) | |
| 13.4.2. The New York City School Match (pg. 259) | |
| 14.1. Weak Priorities (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1.1. The Problem (pg. 263) | |
| 14.1.2. Efficiency Loss (pg. 264) | |
| 14.1.3. The Student-Optimal Assignment with Weak Priorities (pg. 265) | |
| 14.1.4. Restoring Efficiency (pg. 266) | |
| 14.1.5. How to Break Ties If You Must (pg. 272) | |
| 14.2. Constrained Choice (pg. 276) | |
| 14.2.1. Issues (pg. 277) | |
| 14.2.2. From Very Manipulable to Less Manipulable (pg. 279) | |
| 15.1. Preliminaries (pg. 283) | |
| 15.2. Bidding for Courses (pg. 284) | |
| 15.2.1. The Bidding and Allocation Process (pg. 285) | |
| 15.2.2. Issues: Nonmarket Prices and Inefficiency (pg. 286) | |
| 15.2.3. Deferred Acceptance with Bids (pg. 288) | |
| 15.3. The Harvard Business School Method (pg. 290) | |
| 15.3.1. The Harvard Draft Mechanism (pg. 290) | |
| 15.3.2. Strategic Behavior (pg. 291) | |
| 15.3.3. Welfare (pg. 293) | |
| 15.4. The Wharton Method (pg. 295) | |
| 15.4.1. Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (pg. 296) | |
| 15.4.2. The Wharton Experiment (pg. 298) | |
| 16.1. Background (pg. 303) | |
| 16.2. Trading Kidneys (pg. 305) | |
| 16.2.1. Trades versus Waiting List (pg. 306) | |
| 16.2.2. The Kidney Exchange Algorithm (pg. 306) | |
| 16.2.3. Chain Selection Rules (pg. 309) | |
| 16.2.4. Efficiency and Incentives (pg. 311) | |
| 16.3. On the Number of Exchanges (pg. 313) | |
| A.1. Strategic Form Games (pg. 317) | |
| A.1.1. Definition (pg. 317) | |
| A.1.2. Pure and Mixed Strategies (pg. 318) | |
| A.2. Extensive Form Games (pg. 319) | |
| A.2.1. Definition (pg. 320) | |
| A.2.2. Strategies (pg. 321) | |
| A.2.3. Imperfect Information (pg. 322) | |
| A.3. Solving Games (pg. 324) | |
| A.3.1. Dominated and Dominant Strategies (pg. 324) | |
| A.3.2. Elimination of Dominated Strategies (pg. 326) | |
| A.3.3. Nash Equilibrium (pg. 328) | |
| A.4. Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information (pg. 330) | |
| A.4.1. Introductory Example (pg. 330) | |
| A.4.2. Definition (pg. 331) | |
| B.1. Preliminaries (pg. 335) | |
| B.2. The Model (pg. 337) | |
| B.2.1. Mechanism (pg. 337) | |
| B.2.2. Implementing Social Choice Functions (pg. 339) | |
| B.2.3. Direct versus Indirect Mechanism (pg. 340) | |
| B.3. Dominant Strategy Implementation (pg. 341) | |
| B.3.1. The Revelation Principle (pg. 341) | |
| B.3.2. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (pg. 342) | |
| B.3.3. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism (pg. 343) | |
| B.4. Bayesian Mechanism Design (pg. 344) | |
| B.4.1. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (pg. 344) | |
| B.4.2. Trading: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (pg. 345) | |
| C.1. Expected Highest Valuation (pg. 349) | |
| C.1.1. Obtaining the Cumulative Density Function (pg. 350) | |
| C.1.2. Obtaining the Probability Density Function (pg. 350) | |
| C.1.3. Calculate the Expectation (pg. 350) | |
| C.2. Expected Second-Highest Valuation (pg. 351) | |
| C.3. Conditional Expectation of the Highest Valuation (pg. 352) | |
| C.4. Changing the Upper and Lower Bounds (pg. 353) | |
| Chapter 1 (pg. 355) | |
| Chapter 2 (pg. 355) | |
| Chapter 3 (pg. 356) | |
| Chapter 4 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 5 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 6 (pg. 357) | |
| Chapter 7 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 8 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 9 (pg. 358) | |
| Chapter 10 (pg. 359) | |
| Chapter 11 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 12 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 13 (pg. 360) | |
| Chapter 14 (pg. 361) | |
| Chapter 15 (pg. 361) | |
| Chapter 16 (pg. 362) | |
| Appendix A (pg. 362) | |
| Appendix B (pg. 362) | |
Guillaume Haeringer
Guillaume Haeringer is Professor of Economics at the Zicklin School of Business at Baruch College.
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