Lectures on Microeconomics
by Pancs
ISBN: 9780262364454 | Copyright 2018
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Contents (pg. v) | |
Notation (pg. ix) | |
Preface (pg. xi) | |
Chapter 1. General Equilibrium in Competitive Markets (pg. 1) | |
1.1 Introduction (pg. 1) | |
1.2 An Exchange Economy (pg. 3) | |
1.3 Prediction: The Contract Set (pg. 3) | |
1.4 A Refined Prediction: Walrasian Equilibrium (pg. 5) | |
1.5 Common Assumptions (pg. 8) | |
1.6 Graphical Illustrations in the Edgeworth Box (pg. 10) | |
1.7 The First Welfare Theorem (pg. 16) | |
1.8 The Second Welfare Theorem (pg. 18) | |
1.9 Equilibrium Existence (and Nonexistence) (pg. 22) | |
1.10 Uniqueness, Stability, and Comparative Statics (pg. 31) | |
1.11 Time and Uncertainty (pg. 43) | |
1.12 Concluding Remarks (pg. 50) | |
1.13 Appendix: A Proof Sketch of Theorem 1.3 (pg. 53) | |
1.14 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 57) | |
Problems (pg. 58) | |
Chapter 2. Markets and Morals I (pg. 71) | |
2.1 Introduction (pg. 71) | |
2.2 Obedience to Authority Leads to Immoral Behavior (pg. 73) | |
2.3 Markets Lead to Immoral Behavior (pg. 75) | |
2.4 Markets Lead to Moral Behavior (pg. 81) | |
2.5 Concluding Remarks (pg. 86) | |
2.6 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 87) | |
Problems (pg. 88) | |
Chapter 3. From the Jungle to Design Economics (pg. 91) | |
3.1 Introduction (pg. 91) | |
3.2 The Jungle Economy (pg. 92) | |
3.3 Jungle versus Walrasian Market (pg. 97) | |
3.4 A Metaphor for TTC in Walrasian Context (pg. 106) | |
3.5 Matching Agents to Agents (pg. 112) | |
3.6 Concluding Remarks (pg. 124) | |
3.7 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 125) | |
Problems (pg. 126) | |
Chapter 4. Marxism, Socialism, and the Resilience of Markets (pg. 133) | |
4.1 Introduction (pg. 133) | |
4.2 Exploitation in a Production Economy (pg. 133) | |
4.3 The Prevalence of Markets: The Core (pg. 140) | |
4.4 Socialism (pg. 150) | |
4.5 Concluding Remarks (pg. 161) | |
4.6 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 162) | |
Problems (pg. 162) | |
Chapter 5. Inequality (pg. 171) | |
5.1 Introduction (pg. 171) | |
5.2 Risk Seeking (pg. 173) | |
5.3 Superstars (pg. 175) | |
5.4 Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Inequality (pg. 189) | |
5.5 Concluding Remarks (pg. 200) | |
5.6 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 201) | |
Problems (pg. 201) | |
Chapter 6. Markets and Morals II (pg. 207) | |
6.1 Introduction (pg. 207) | |
6.2 When Having Markets Does Not Feel Quite Right (pg. 208) | |
6.3 A Signaling Model of Gift Giving (pg. 218) | |
6.4 Concluding Remarks (pg. 229) | |
6.5 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 230) | |
Problems (pg. 230) | |
Chapter 7. Kantian Cooperation (pg. 235) | |
7.1 Introduction (pg. 235) | |
7.2 Kantian Equilibrium (pg. 238) | |
7.3 An Application to Voting (pg. 244) | |
7.4 An Application to Responsibility (pg. 248) | |
7.5 Concluding Remarks (pg. 249) | |
7.6 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 250) | |
Problems (pg. 251) | |
Chapter 8. Unintended Consequences of Policy Interventions (pg. 257) | |
8.1 Introduction (pg. 257) | |
8.2 The Utilitarian Social Welfare Function (pg. 258) | |
8.3 Routing (pg. 259) | |
8.4 Local Public Goods (pg. 270) | |
8.5 Concluding Remarks (pg. 274) | |
8.6 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 274) | |
Problems (pg. 275) | |
Chapter 9. Coda (pg. 277) | |
9.1 Methodological Individualism (pg. 277) | |
9.2 Design by Constrained Optimization (pg. 279) | |
9.3 Constraints in Economic Design (pg. 288) | |
9.4 A Curious Case of Incompatible Constraints (pg. 289) | |
9.5 Economics as an Art Form (pg. 294) | |
9.6 Bibliographical Notes (pg. 295) | |
Problems (pg. 296) | |
References (pg. 301) | |
Index (pg. 311) |
Romans Pancs
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