Introduction to Industrial Organization, 2e

by Cabral

ISBN: 9780262338936 | Copyright 2017

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Contents (pg. v)
Preface (pg. ix)
Acknowledgments (pg. x)
Chapter 1: What is industrial organization? (pg. 1)
1.1 An Example (pg. 2)
1.2 Central Questions (pg. 3)
1.3 Coming Next.... (pg. 9)
Part One: Microeconomics Foundations (pg. 13)
Chapter 2: Consumers (pg. 15)
2.1 Consumer Preferences and Demand (pg. 15)
2.2 Demand Elasticity (pg. 19)
2.3 Estimating the Demand Curve (pg. 26)
2.4 Are Consumers Really Rational? (pg. 29)
Chapter 3: Firms (pg. 35)
3.1 The Firm's Production, Cost, and Supply Functions (pg. 36)
3.2 Pricing (pg. 43)
3.3 Do Firms Maximize Profits? (pg. 52)
3.4 What Determines a Firm's Boundaries? (pg. 54)
3.5 Why are Firms Different? (pg. 56)
Chapter 4: Competition, Equilibrium, andEfficiency (pg. 67)
4.1 Perfect Competition (pg. 68)
4.2 Competitive Selection (pg. 74)
4.3 Monopolistic Competition (pg. 79)
4.4 Efficiency (pg. 81)
Chapter 5: Market Failure and Public Policy (pg. 93)
5.1 Externalitites and Market Failure (pg. 94)
5.2 Imperfect Information (pg. 99)
5.3 Monopoly (pg. 102)
5.4 Regulation (pg. 107)
5.5 competition Policy and Antitrust (pg. 109)
5.6 Firm Regulation (pg. 110)
Chapter 6: Price Discrimination (pg. 121)
6.1 Selection by Indicators (pg. 125)
6.2 Self Selection (pg. 130)
6.3 Non-Linear Pricing (pg. 135)
6.4 Auctions and Negotiations (pg. 140)
6.5 Is Price Discrimination Legal? Should it be? (pg. 144)
Part Two: Oligopoly (pg. 157)
Chapter 7: Games and Strategies (pg. 159)
7.1 Nash Equilibrium (pg. 161)
7.2 Sequential Games (pg. 167)
7.3 Repeated Games (pg. 172)
7.4 Information: 7.4 Information (pg. 174)
Chapter 8: Oligopoly (pg. 185)
8.1 the Bertrand Model (pg. 186)
8.2 The Cournot Model (pg. 194)
8.3 Bertrand vs. Cournot (pg. 200)
8.4 The Models at Work: Comparative Statics (pg. 202)
Chapter 9:: Collusion and Price Wars (pg. 217)
9.1 Stability of Collusive Agreements (pg. 218)
9.2 Price Wars (pg. 222)
9.3 Factors that Facilitate Collusion (pg. 227)
9.4 Empirical Analysis of Cartels and Collusion (pg. 232)
9.5 Public Policy (pg. 234)
Part Three: Entry and Market Structure (pg. 249)
Chapter 10: Market Structure (pg. 251)
10.1 Entry Costs and Market Structure (pg. 253)
10.2 Endogenous vs. Exogenous Entry Costs (pg. 260)
10.3 Intensity of Competition, Market Structure, and Market Power (pg. 264)
10.4 Entry and Welfare (pg. 269)
10.5 Entry Regulation (pg. 273)
Chapter 11: Horizontal mergers (pg. 281)
11.1 Economic Effects of Horizontal Mergers (pg. 282)
11.2 Horizontal Merger Dynamics (pg. 288)
11.3 Horizontal Merger Policy (pg. 292)
Chapter 12: Market Foreclosure (pg. 303)
12.1 Entry Deterrence (pg. 304)
12.2 Exclusive contracts, bundling, and Foreclosure (pg. 312)
12.3 Predatory Pricing (pg. 317)
12.4 Public Policy towards foreclosure (pg. 320)
Part four: Non-Price Strategies (pg. 331)
Chapter 13: Vertical Relations (pg. 333)
13.1 Vertical Integration (pg. 334)
13.2 Vertical Restraints (pg. 340)
13.3 Public Policy (pg. 342)
Chapter 14: Product Differentiation (pg. 349)
14.1 Demand for Differentiated Products (pg. 350)
14.2 Competition with Differentiated Products (pg. 354)
14.3 Advertising and Branding (pg. 362)
14.4 Consumer Behavior and Firm Strategy (pg. 368)
14.5 Public Policy (pg. 371)
chapter 15: Innovation (pg. 377)
15.1 Market Structure and innovation Incentives (pg. 378)
15.2 Diffusion of Knowledge and innovations (pg. 383)
15.3 Innovation strategy (pg. 385)
15.4 Public Policy (pg. 391)
Chapter 16: Networks (pg. 399)
16.1 Chicken and Egg (pg. 401)
16.2 Innvation Adoption with Network Effects (pg. 405)
16.3 Firm Strategy (pg. 414)
16.4 Public Policy (pg. 419)
Index (pg. 427)

Luis M. B. Cabral

Luis M.B. Cabral is Professor of Economics at the Leonard Stern School of Business, New York University.


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