Introduction to Industrial Organization, 2e
by Cabral
ISBN: 9780262363976 | Copyright 2017
Instructor Requests
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| Contents (pg. v) | |
| Preface (pg. ix) | |
| Acknowledgments (pg. x) | |
| Chapter 1: What is industrial organization? (pg. 1) | |
| 1.1 An Example (pg. 2) | |
| 1.2 Central Questions (pg. 3) | |
| 1.3 Coming Next.... (pg. 9) | |
| Part One: Microeconomics Foundations (pg. 13) | |
| Chapter 2: Consumers (pg. 15) | |
| 2.1 Consumer Preferences and Demand (pg. 15) | |
| 2.2 Demand Elasticity (pg. 19) | |
| 2.3 Estimating the Demand Curve (pg. 26) | |
| 2.4 Are Consumers Really Rational? (pg. 29) | |
| Chapter 3: Firms (pg. 35) | |
| 3.1 The Firm's Production, Cost, and Supply Functions (pg. 36) | |
| 3.2 Pricing (pg. 43) | |
| 3.3 Do Firms Maximize Profits? (pg. 52) | |
| 3.4 What Determines a Firm's Boundaries? (pg. 54) | |
| 3.5 Why are Firms Different? (pg. 56) | |
| Chapter 4: Competition, Equilibrium, andEfficiency (pg. 67) | |
| 4.1 Perfect Competition (pg. 68) | |
| 4.2 Competitive Selection (pg. 74) | |
| 4.3 Monopolistic Competition (pg. 79) | |
| 4.4 Efficiency (pg. 81) | |
| Chapter 5: Market Failure and Public Policy (pg. 93) | |
| 5.1 Externalitites and Market Failure (pg. 94) | |
| 5.2 Imperfect Information (pg. 99) | |
| 5.3 Monopoly (pg. 102) | |
| 5.4 Regulation (pg. 107) | |
| 5.5 competition Policy and Antitrust (pg. 109) | |
| 5.6 Firm Regulation (pg. 110) | |
| Chapter 6: Price Discrimination (pg. 121) | |
| 6.1 Selection by Indicators (pg. 125) | |
| 6.2 Self Selection (pg. 130) | |
| 6.3 Non-Linear Pricing (pg. 135) | |
| 6.4 Auctions and Negotiations (pg. 140) | |
| 6.5 Is Price Discrimination Legal? Should it be? (pg. 144) | |
| Part Two: Oligopoly (pg. 157) | |
| Chapter 7: Games and Strategies (pg. 159) | |
| 7.1 Nash Equilibrium (pg. 161) | |
| 7.2 Sequential Games (pg. 167) | |
| 7.3 Repeated Games (pg. 172) | |
| 7.4 Information: 7.4 Information (pg. 174) | |
| Chapter 8: Oligopoly (pg. 185) | |
| 8.1 the Bertrand Model (pg. 186) | |
| 8.2 The Cournot Model (pg. 194) | |
| 8.3 Bertrand vs. Cournot (pg. 200) | |
| 8.4 The Models at Work: Comparative Statics (pg. 202) | |
| Chapter 9:: Collusion and Price Wars (pg. 217) | |
| 9.1 Stability of Collusive Agreements (pg. 218) | |
| 9.2 Price Wars (pg. 222) | |
| 9.3 Factors that Facilitate Collusion (pg. 227) | |
| 9.4 Empirical Analysis of Cartels and Collusion (pg. 232) | |
| 9.5 Public Policy (pg. 234) | |
| Part Three: Entry and Market Structure (pg. 249) | |
| Chapter 10: Market Structure (pg. 251) | |
| 10.1 Entry Costs and Market Structure (pg. 253) | |
| 10.2 Endogenous vs. Exogenous Entry Costs (pg. 260) | |
| 10.3 Intensity of Competition, Market Structure, and Market Power (pg. 264) | |
| 10.4 Entry and Welfare (pg. 269) | |
| 10.5 Entry Regulation (pg. 273) | |
| Chapter 11: Horizontal mergers (pg. 281) | |
| 11.1 Economic Effects of Horizontal Mergers (pg. 282) | |
| 11.2 Horizontal Merger Dynamics (pg. 288) | |
| 11.3 Horizontal Merger Policy (pg. 292) | |
| Chapter 12: Market Foreclosure (pg. 303) | |
| 12.1 Entry Deterrence (pg. 304) | |
| 12.2 Exclusive contracts, bundling, and Foreclosure (pg. 312) | |
| 12.3 Predatory Pricing (pg. 317) | |
| 12.4 Public Policy towards foreclosure (pg. 320) | |
| Part four: Non-Price Strategies (pg. 331) | |
| Chapter 13: Vertical Relations (pg. 333) | |
| 13.1 Vertical Integration (pg. 334) | |
| 13.2 Vertical Restraints (pg. 340) | |
| 13.3 Public Policy (pg. 342) | |
| Chapter 14: Product Differentiation (pg. 349) | |
| 14.1 Demand for Differentiated Products (pg. 350) | |
| 14.2 Competition with Differentiated Products (pg. 354) | |
| 14.3 Advertising and Branding (pg. 362) | |
| 14.4 Consumer Behavior and Firm Strategy (pg. 368) | |
| 14.5 Public Policy (pg. 371) | |
| chapter 15: Innovation (pg. 377) | |
| 15.1 Market Structure and innovation Incentives (pg. 378) | |
| 15.2 Diffusion of Knowledge and innovations (pg. 383) | |
| 15.3 Innovation strategy (pg. 385) | |
| 15.4 Public Policy (pg. 391) | |
| Chapter 16: Networks (pg. 399) | |
| 16.1 Chicken and Egg (pg. 401) | |
| 16.2 Innvation Adoption with Network Effects (pg. 405) | |
| 16.3 Firm Strategy (pg. 414) | |
| 16.4 Public Policy (pg. 419) | |
| Index (pg. 427) | |
Luis M. B. Cabral
Luis M.B. Cabral is Professor of Economics at the Leonard Stern School of Business, New York University.
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