Game Theory

by Fudenberg, Tirole

ISBN: 9780262273305 | Copyright 1991

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Contents (pg. ix)
Introduction (pg. xix)
I Static Games of Complete Information (pg. 1)
1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium (pg. 3)
2 Iterated Struct Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium (pg. 45)
II Dynamic Games of Complete Information (pg. 65)
3 Extensive-Form Games (pg. 67)
4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions (pg. 107)
5 Repeated Games (pg. 145)
III Static Games of Incomplete Information (pg. 207)
6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium (pg. 209)
7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design (pg. 243)
IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information (pg. 319)
8 Equilibrium Refinements (pg. 321)
9 Reputation Effects (pg. 367)
10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information (pg. 397)
V Advanced Topics (pg. 435)
11 More Equilibrium Refinements (pg. 437)
12 Advanced Topics in Strategic-Form Games (pg. 479)
13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium (pg. 501)
14 Common Knowledge and Games (pg. 541)
References (pg. 571)
Index (pg. 573)

Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg is Professor of Economics at MIT.

Jean Tirole

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.


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