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The Economics of Contracts, 2e
A Primer, 2nd Edition
by Salanié
ISBN: 9780262257879 | Copyright 2005
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| Contents (pg. v) | |
| Foreword to the Second Edition (pg. ix) | |
| Foreword to the First Edition (pg. xi) | |
| 1 Introduction (pg. 1) | |
| 1.1 The Great Families of Models (pg. 3) | |
| 1.2 The Principal–Agent Model (pg. 5) | |
| 1.3 Overview of the Book (pg. 6) | |
| 2 Adverse Selection: General Theory (pg. 11) | |
| 2.1 Mechanism Design (pg. 13) | |
| 2.2 A Discrete Model of Price Discrimination (pg. 18) | |
| 2.3 The Standard Model (pg. 27) | |
| 3 Adverse Selection: Examples and Extensions (pg. 43) | |
| 3.1 Examples of Applications (pg. 43) | |
| 3.2 Extensions (pg. 57) | |
| 4 Signaling Models (pg. 97) | |
| 4.1 The Market for Secondhand Cars (pg. 98) | |
| 4.2 Costly Signals (pg. 99) | |
| 4.3 Costless Signals (pg. 107) | |
| 4.4 Other Examples (pg. 114) | |
| 4.5 The Informed Principal (pg. 116) | |
| 5 Moral Hazard (pg. 119) | |
| 5.1 A Simple Example (pg. 122) | |
| 5.2 The Standard Model (pg. 124) | |
| 5.3 Extensions (pg. 134) | |
| 5.4 Examples of Applications (pg. 149) | |
| 6 The Dynamics of Complete Contracts (pg. 161) | |
| 6.1 Commitment and Renegotiation (pg. 162) | |
| 6.2 Strategic Commitment (pg. 164) | |
| 6.3 Adverse Selection (pg. 168) | |
| 6.4 Moral Hazard (pg. 179) | |
| 7 Incomplete Contracts (pg. 193) | |
| 7.1 Property Rights, Holdup, and Underinvestment (pg. 195) | |
| 7.2 The Irrelevance Theorems (pg. 200) | |
| 7.3 Concluding Remarks (pg. 205) | |
| 8 Some Empirical Work (pg. 211) | |
| 8.1 Dealing with Unobserved Heterogeneity (pg. 212) | |
| 8.2 Auctions (pg. 216) | |
| 8.3 Tests of Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets (pg. 218) | |
| Appendix (pg. 223) | |
| Name Index (pg. 233) | |
| Subject Index (pg. 235) | |
Bernard Salanié
Bernard Salanié is Professor of Economics at Columbia University. Formerly Director of CREST (Paris), he has taught at Ecole Polytechnique, Stanford University, the University of Chicago, and the Toulouse School of Economics. Salanié is the author of Microeconomics of Market Failures (2000) and The Economics of Contracts: A Primer (second edition, 2005), both published by the MIT Press.
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