Contract Theory

by Bolton, Dewatripont

ISBN: 9780262257961 | Copyright 2004

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Contents (pg. v)
Preface (pg. xv)
1 - Introduction (pg. 1)
I - STATIC BILATERAL CONTRACTING (pg. 45)
2 - Hidden Information, Screening (pg. 47)
3 - Hidden Information, Signaling (pg. 99)
4 - Hidden Action, Moral Hazard (pg. 129)
5 - Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information (pg. 171)
6 - Multidimensional Incentive Problems (pg. 199)
II - STATIC MULTILATERAL CONTRACTING (pg. 237)
7 - Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions (pg. 239)
8 - Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion (pg. 297)
III - REPEATED BILATERAL CONTRACTING (pg. 365)
9 - Dynamic Adverse Selection (pg. 367)
10 - Dynamic Moral Hazard (pg. 419)
IV - INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS (pg. 487)
11 - Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design (pg. 489)
12 - Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information (pg. 553)
13 - Markets and Contracts (pg. 601)
APPENDIX (pg. 645)
14 - Exercises (pg. 647)
References (pg. 687)
Author Index (pg. 709)
Subject Index (pg. 715)

Patrick Bolton

Patrick Bolton is John H. Scully Professor of Finance at Princeton University and managing editor of The Journal of the European Economic Association.


Mathias Dewatripont

Mathias Dewatripont is Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, a Research Fellow at its European Centre for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES), and Research Director of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).


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